Sadar Bibi and another v Munir Ahmed and Others (2017 SCMR 344)

If the “eye-witnesses produced by the prosecution are disbelieved to the extent of some accused person attributed effective role, then the said eye-witnesses cannot be relied upon for the purpose of convicting another accused person attributed a similar role, without availability of independent corroboration.”


The two accused and their co-accused were convicted under Section 302(b) of the PPC and sentenced to death for a revenge killing of two deceased persons. The High Court upheld the conviction and death sentence of the two accused, but dismissed the convictions of the remaining co-accused.

The prosecution offered witness testimony that Accused 1 and Co-accused 1 both shot at the chest of Deceased 1, causing his death. Yet Co-accused 1 was acquitted, and the acquittal was not challenged by the complainant or state, while Accused 1 was sentenced to death. Similarly, Accused 2 and Co-accused 2 were alleged to have jointly beheaded Deceased 2, but Co-accused 2 was acquitted without challenge while Accused 2 was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court repeated the settled law that “if the eye-witnesses produced by the prosecution are disbelieved to the extent of some accused person attributed effective role, then the said eye-witnesses cannot be relied upon for the purpose of convicting another accused person attributed a similar role, without availability of independent corroboration to the extent of such other person.”

In this case, the Court found no such corroboration. There was also delay in lodging the FIR and conducting the post-mortem, which inferred that there had been some deliberation and consultation between the complainant and the police. The Court also found that the Defence was unable to cross-examine the investigating officer through whom all the facts and circumstances favouring the accused and co-accused persons could have been brought on the record. In the absence of any independent corroboration, the accused and co-accused persons were acquitted of the charge by extending them benefit of doubt and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.