The Trial Stage: Navigating Guilt, Innocence, and the Death Sentence

The accused was charged with murder. The complainant alleged that the accused had gotten into a quarrel with the deceased over religious issues, which turned into a physical altercation. The complainant said he and others present separated the accused and the decreased. Two days later, the accused allegedly came across the deceased again and got into another religious argument, which resulted in an exchange of verbal abuses and the accused leaving while uttering threats. The complainant alleged that the accused then returned to the spot with a pistol and shot at both the deceased and the complainant, causing injuries to both. The decreased succumbed to his injuries in hospital. The accused was convicted under PPC 302(b) and sentenced to death at trial, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by the Lahore High Court. The court noted that “it cannot be denied that motive is always very relevant to determine the quantum of sentence that might be awarded to a person against whom charge of murder is proved.” The court accepted the motive, and noted that “religious feelings always cause an agitation in mind if something is said against the belief of a person and under such impulse[,] when there was not only hot discussion but also there was exchange of abuses, the crime apparently has been committed in this case under compelling circumstances.” Thus the Supreme Court accepted that the motive was sufficiently provoking as to counsel against a death sentence, and upheld the commutation.

The accused was convicted of murder under PPC 302(b) and sentenced to death by the trial court. He was a tailor who used his scissors to injure three people near his shop, one of whom later succumbed to death. The Lahore High Court converted the conviction to PPC 302(c), finding that the lack of previous enmity between the parties, the place of the occurrence, and the fact that the accused used his tailoring scissors all showed the incident was “a sudden occurrence developing without any premeditation.” The sentence was reduced to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the case did not fall under PPC 302(c) because, under PPC 300, such treatment is only appropriate if both “the case was one of a sudden fight taking place without any premeditation in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel” and the accused did not take “undue advantage or must not have acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” Finding that the accused did take advantage and act cruelly and unusually by wounding three people in response to the quarrel, the Supreme Court reinstated the conviction under PPC 302(b). However, the Court also reduced the sentence to life imprisonment, stating that the motive set up by the prosecution was not proven (see below) and that “the occurrence in this case was indeed an occurrence taking place at the spur of the moment without any premeditation and, thus, the sentence of death passed by the trial court . . . was not justified.”

The accused was convicted under PPC section 302(b) and sentenced to death for the murder of his brother. The Lahore High Court confirmed conviction and sentence. As motive, the prosecution alleged that the accused had demanded that the deceased give his daughter’s hand in marriage to the accused’s (and the deceased’s) cousin, and that the deceased had refused. The only evidence to support such motive was the testimony of the complainant, the deceased’s widow. The accused, when questioned about his motive in court, said he did not wish to discuss it. The court found the widow’s testimony alone to be insufficient evidence to prove the motive, and stated that “once the prosecution sets up a particular motive but fails to prove the same, then, ordinarily capital sentence of death is not awarded, which is a consistent view of the Courts since long.” The court maintained the accused’s conviction but commuted his sentence to life imprisonment with the benefit of Cr.P.C. section 382-B, plus fine.

The accused was convicted under PPC 302(b) and sentenced to death for the murder of his wife. The Lahore High Court upheld the conviction but commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The complainant, maternal uncle of the deceased, claimed that the accused had killed her because he intended to contract a second marriage which the deceased opposed. The court found very strong evidence to support the conviction—witness accounts were corroborated by the medical examiner’s autopsy report, and there was strong circumstantial evidence because the accused fled town, did not inform police of his wife’s death and did not participate in his wife’s last rites. However, the court found that the motive alleged by the prosecution “[did] not stand to reason as the appellant could have divorced his wife if she was not giving him permission to marry again as alleged” and because the accused and the deceased had only recently been married themselves. The Court further noted that there was no evidence as to whom the accused wanted to marry. Because the motive was not proven and was not reasonable, the Supreme Court upheld the commutation.

Four co-accused were convicted of killing two people and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) read with PPC 34. Two other co-accused were given life sentences for causing non-fatal injury and nine co-accused were acquitted because the court did not believe they were actually involved. The High Court acquitted all co-accused of all charges, finding the prosecution’s case fabricated. The complainant alleged that a group of 17 people armed with bore shotguns and rifles entered his courtyard and began shooting, killing two people and injuring others. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittals, noting several issues with the witness testimony, including:

• Independent witnesses were abandoned by the prosecution;
• The brother of the complainant denied that the incident was witnessed by the complainant and thereby contradicted other prosecution witnesses;
• Testimony of prosecution witnesses contradicted the FIR regarding the nature of weapon used by accused;
• The FIR attributed effective shots four accused, and prosecution witness statements attributed effective shots had been attributed to five accused persons. The Court found it humanly impossible to discern who fired which shots in such a situation “reigned by panic and pandemonium;”
• The number of assailants in the circumstances of the case appeared to have been exaggerated;
• A firearm entry wound found on the person of one of the prosecution witnesses allegedly caused by a shot fired from a distance of 13 feet was accompanied by blackening, which is not possible beyond 3 feet.

Finding that that “prosecution version was full of doubts from whatever angle it was looked at,” and noting most of the accused persons had been charged because of previous enmity, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittals.

The accused was convicted under PPC 302(b) and 149 and sentenced to death. The Lahore High Court confirmed the death sentence. The complainant alleged that while he was travelling, the accused and four armed co-accused surrounded his vehicle. The deceased was pulled out of the vehicle and attacked by the co-accused, and shot in the right thigh by the accused. The deceased died at the scene. The motive for the attack was said to be previous litigation. All co-accused were acquitted.

The Supreme Court found several failings in the witness testimony. Both eye-witnesses were not residents of the locality where the crime took place and were only there by chance – though they claimed to have been travelling in the vehicle with the deceased, there was no evidence to support that. The medical evidence did not support the witnesses’ visual account regarding number and location of injuries. A gunshot wound on the deceased was blackened, indicating the shot was fired from a distance of 3 feet or less, but the site plan showed that the distance between the assailants and the deceased was 11 feet – meaning that the presence of the eye-witnesses at the spot is doubtful. The court concluded that if they “[h]ad they been present at the spot and had witnessed the occurrence, they could have ascribed the correct role to the accused and explain all the injuries on the person of the deceased”. Thus the accused was acquitted.

Both eye witnesses also admitted that the accused had no direct enmity to commit the offence, and no evidence of previous enmity was falsified by the court. The witnesses also made improvements to their accounts on material points.

Given the evidentiary problems, the Court found that the prosecution had not been able to prove its case beyond the shadow of doubt, allowed the appeal and ruled that the accused be acquitted.

The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b). The Sindh High Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The accused, a teacher, was alleged to have attacked the deceased, a head teacher, with scissors and stabbed him 19 times because the deceased had transferred him to another school. Three eye-witnesses were all related to the deceased. The Court discredited the witness testimony, stating that inflicting 19 stab wounds would have taken some time and that it was “unnatural conduct” that three present relatives of the deceased would have made no effort to intervene to save the deceased or to apprehend the accused after. Thus, the actual presence of the witnesses at the occurrence was “highly doubtful” and no explicit reliance cold be placed on their testimony. The motive was also disbelieved, because the deceased did not have authority to transfer the accused. Stating that the prosecution had “miserably failed to prove the presence of the eye-witnesses on the crime spot at the fateful time, therefore, it is held to be an unseen crime,” the Court found the remaining evidence insufficient to support a conviction and acquitted the accused.

The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b). The death sentence was confirmed by the Lahore High Court. The supposed eyewitnesses gave a narrative description of the entire incident with great accuracy of many details, but mentioned only injuries inflicted with a firearm. The post-mortem investigation revealed six additional injuries caused by a dagger, at which time a supplementary statement of the complainant was submitted mentioning use of a dagger. When the complainant renounced the supplementary statement at trial, it was introduced into the statement of another prosecution witness. Because the medical evidence was “entirely inconsistent” with the witness accounts, the accounts lost credibility and the Court deemed the crime an unwitnessed occurrence. Moreover, the same witness testimony had been disbelieved in the case of a co-accused, and the Court held that “Whenever witnesses are found to have falsely deposed with regard to the involvement of one co-accused then, ordinarily, they cannot be relied upon qua the other co-accused unless their testimony is sufficiently corroborated through strong corroboratory evidence, coming from unimpeachable source.” Finding no such corroboratory evidence, the accused was acquitted.

Three accused were convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of two individuals under PPC 148 and 302(b). The Lahore High Court set aside the conviction of one of the co-accused while upholding sentences of the two others. The Supreme Court noted that while the underlying incident reportedly took place at 2 a.m., no sources of light were taken into possession by the investigating officer. The presence of light was a determinant factor for the identification of the accused, given that the eyewitnesses claimed to have identified the accused from a distance of approximately 100 feet. The Court emphasized that while the complainant alleged that the accused had been armed with particular firearms, the FIR did not include any such specifications. It was only during trial that the witnesses mentioned seeing the accused with specific weapons, and this testimony was contradicted by the medical report. The Court found these statements to be deliberate improvements and omissions made by the witnesses to bring the case in line with the medical evidence. In view of these inconsistencies and in the absence of an independent corroborative evidence, the Court held that the High Court had erred in upholding the sentences of the accused, while also dismissing the death sentence of the other co-accused based on the same evidence. The Court held that, “if the eyewitnesses produced by the prosecution are disbelieved to the extent of some accused person’s attributed role, then the said eyewitness cannot be relied upon for the purpose of convicting another accused person attributed a similar role.” For these reasons, the accused were acquitted.

The accused were convicted of dacoity with murder under PPC 460, 396 and 302(b), read with PPC 34, P.P.C. The Trial Court sentenced them to death. The Lahore High Court upheld the death sentence against one accused and commuted the sentence for the others to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court found many issues with identification. The offence took place after dark with no source of light, which made it less likely that a witness could accurately identify any suspect. During the test identification parade, the accused were identified buy not with reference to any role played by them in the incident. The Court quoted an earlier judgment stating that“such a test identification parade is legally laconic and is of no evidentiary value.” The witness who made the test identification later identified the accused in court after 14 prosecution witnesses had already made their statements. On these occasions the accused were physically present in the dock, meaning the eye-witness had several opportunities to see the accused in the courtroom. Weapons recovered and medical evidence also failed to pinpoint the accused as the actual culprits. Therefore all accused were acquitted of the charges.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 392. The Lahore High Court converted the conviction to PPC 394 read with section 34, and commuted the sentence to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The victim was shot in a general store. A group of witnesses (including his son) heard the gun shot and rushed over just in time to see the assailants fleeing on motorcycles. The complainant son did not provide descriptions of the assailants in the FIR or in his statements recorded under Cr.P.C. 161. Thus there was no benchmark against which to test whether the accused questioned over a year after the crime were the true culprits. The accused were identified by a witness at an identification parade over a year after the alleged crime. The parade itself was flawed as the accused was shown to the witnesses before the procedure began, and because the Magistrate failed to certify that the other people in the parade were of similar age, height, build and colouring. Subsequent in-court identification of the accused by witnesses was inconsequential, because an identity parade is required whenever the witness saw the culprit only fleetingly. The identification was thus discredited and accused was acquitted.

The accused were convicted of dacoity with murder and sentenced to death under ATA 396 & 394 for allegedly robbing a bank and killing a guard. The Lahore High Court confirmed the sentences. The Supreme Court found the identification parade flawed because the prosecution witnesses had seen the accused in the police station prior to the parade. The Court clarified that “it is the duty and obligation of the authority that precautionary measures are necessary to conceal the identity of the accused” The identifying witness did not identify the accused with respect to a specific role in the offence, which made the identification “of no value and unreliable.” Moreover, a joint parade was held for both accused, and the Court stated that “It is also settled principle of law that is identification parade of each accused should be held separately otherwise confusion would be created.” Because the parade was not held in accordance with law, the Court found subsequent in-court identification of the accused to be of no value. Thus, the identification was deemed unreliable and, due to insufficient remaining evidence, the accused were acquitted.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under s. 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 read with PPC 302(a). The Federal Shariat Court converted the conviction to PPC 302(b) and confirmed the sentence. The accused allegedly robbed a store and shot the owner, who later succumbed to his injuries. The Supreme Court found the test identification parade defective because there was an unexplained delay in conducting the parade and because a joint parade was held for multiple accused. Furthermore, the witnesses did not state the role attributed to each accused persons, making the identification of no value. The Court held that these cumulative errors made the identification unsafe and, finding insufficient other evidence, acquitted the accused.

The accused were convicted of murder under PPC 302(b) and sentenced to death. The sentence was confirmed by the Lahore High Court. The incident involved robbery of a store in which two people were killed. The accused were both identified in a joint identification parade, a practise which the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated in unlawful. The accused were also identified in court, but the Supreme Court stated that this is an unsafe practise which was never approved, explaining that “Identification of an accused person before the trial court during the trial has already been held by this Court to be unsafe particularly when the eye-witnesses making their statements before the trial court were examined after many other prosecution witnesses had already been examined and on all such occasions the accused persons could conveniently be seen by the eye-witnesses in the dock.”Thus, the identification was unreliable and without sufficient other evidence, the accused were acquitted.

The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to death under 302(b). The Lahore High Court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The deceased was allegedly killed at night by two strangers with pistols. They were identified in a test identification parade ten months later. The Supreme Court stated that, given the circumstances of the crime, it was questionable whether a witness would be able to correctly identify the culprit after so long. The accused were not identified with respect to their specific roles in the offence, rendering the identification meaningless. Both accused were identified in a joint parade, which the Supreme Court again clarified is unlawful, and the records did not indicate how many other people were included in the parade, making it impossible to test the parade’s validity. Thus the identification was discredited and the accused were acquitted.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) for the murder of his wife. This sentence was upheld by the High Court of Balochistan. The Supreme Court considering the statement of the complainant, who brought the deceased to the hospital, took a skeptical view of the fact that the complainant did not mention two other eyewitnesses to the crime, who were allegedly present at the victim’s residence at the time of the incident. The Court noted that the purported eyewitnesses did not help the deceased, despite having seen her in an injurious state. Furthermore, no reasons were presented by the eyewitnesses to justify their presence at the residence and the medical reports further contradicted their statements. In light of these inconsistencies, the Court held that the prosecution had not established the accused’s involvement in the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the mere fact that the victim had died at their joint residence was insufficient to establish the accused’s culpability. The accused was acquitted.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) for murdering the deceased by firing at him with a pistol, in the presence of other witnesses. The Lahore High Court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the ocular testimony provided by the witnesses was not reliable. The witnesses claimed to have seen the accused at night time, when it could not have been easy for them to identify him. The medical report submitted also contradicted the witnesses’ testimony on the distance between the deceased and the accused. Finally, the recovery of a pistol in the accused’s possession was legally inconsequential, as no crime empties or metallic pieces were sent to the Forensic Scientific Laboratory for testing. In light of these inconsistencies, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish its case against the accused. Thus, extending the benefit of doubt, the accused was acquitted.

Four accused were convicted and sentenced to death for murder, under PPC 302(b). The sentences were confirmed by the Lahore High Court. The underlying incident took place at night and was reportedly unwitnessed. Before trial, the prosecution introduced some circumstantial evidence. Waj takker evidence (a term used by the Court to refer to an eyewitness who claims to have seen the accused returning from the scene of the crime) was supplied by a witness who lived 100 miles away from the scene and could not justify his presence there. Statements from two other witnesses, who allegedly saw the accused throwing the dead bodies of the deceased in a well on the night of the incident but made no attempts to contact the police, were also included. The Court dismissed these statements as unreliable. Reports matching some crime empties with the ones found in the custody of the accused were also disregarded, as they did not satisfy the provisions of section 103 of CrPC. Furthermore, the Court held a judicial confession submitted by the accused to a magistrate before the Trial Court cannot be relied upon to uphold a conviction unless independent corroborative evidence strengthening such submission is also submitted. Finally, since the accused also submitted an application to the trial court challenging the confessions attributed to them and stated that they had never been produced before a magistrate to record their confessions, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused were thus acquitted.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) for murdering and sodomizing the deceased. The Peshawar High Court confirmed the sentence. The lower court’s conviction was based on the following evidence: a retracted confession of one of the co-accused, the last seen evidence of an eyewitness, evidence regarding the motive of the crime, medical evidence and a statement made by the accused regarding the scene of the crime. When analysing the circumstantial evidence presented, the Court held that it is “required to take extra care and caution to narrowly examine such evidence with [a] purely judicial approach to satisfy itself, about its intrinsic worth and reliability, also ensuring that no dishonesty was committed during the course of collecting such evidence.” Given this principle, the Court found that the eyewitness testimony and the evidence regarding the accused’s motives was of little value, since the record contained indication that they were either manufactured by the police or acquired by chance. The Court also noted that a confession made by the accused constitutes corroborative evidence only when it is made voluntarily and is based on a true account of the facts. In this case, the Court held that the confession made by the accused could not be considered, as he had been given no time for reflection and was not provided with the counselling services that he was entitled to as a minor. Finally, the Court maintained that in order for it to rely on circumstantial evidence to uphold capital punishment, all circumstantial evidence needs to be inter-linked, to the point where it constitutes a single unbroken chain. Because even a single doubt on the merits of the circumstantial evidence could render the evidence unreliable, the accused and co-accused were acquitted of their charges.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) for the murder of the deceased. This sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by the Lahore High Court, noting that the prosecution had failed to establish motive and the recovery of weapons from accused had been legally inconsequential. The Supreme Court noted that several factors had rendered the evidence questionable. The eyewitnesses were close relatives of the complainant and the victim but were not the ones to bring the victim to the hospital, they failed to justify their presence at the scene of the crime, and they later edited their statements to bring them in line with the medical reports. There was also no independent evidence to corroborate their claims. Additionally, the Court found that no FIR had been filed at the local police station and that a post-mortem was conducted 12 hours after the deceased was brought to the hospital, providing some indication of deliberate delays. Taking into account these discrepancies, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused was subsequently acquitted.

Three of the accused were convicted and sentenced to death for murder under PPC 302, 148, 149 and 460.The Lahore High Court upheld the death sentence for two of the accused under PPC 396, while commuting the sentence to life imprisonment for one of the accused. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the case record contained several discrepancies, and could not be used to uphold the death sentence. The Court noted that at the time of the incident, the complainant did not make any effort to inform the police and that an FIR was filed several hours after the investigating officer arrived at the scene. Additionally, the post-mortem was not conducted promptly, and evidence regarding the witness’ identification of the accused could not be relied upon, as the incident allegedly took place at night but no evidence of a light source was collected from the scene. The Court also noted that statements made by the witnesses directly contradicted the medical reports, as they claimed that the assailants fired the shot from a distance of about four karams (22 feet) but the blackening and burning around the margins of the wounds on the deceased indicated that the shot was fired from a very close range. Finally, the recovery of weapons from the accused was not legally consequential, as they did not match the crime empties retrieved from the scene. Taking into account the cumulative effect of these inconsistencies, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the accused’s involvement beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the accused were acquitted of all charges.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under PPC (302(b) and ATC 7(a), among many other charges, and 27 co-accused were all given life sentences in connection with a procession. The Lahore High Court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The accused persons were part of a procession that exchanged cross-fire with local police. No police official was injured whereas three members of the procession suffered bullet injuries. One person was killed.

The Supreme Court noted several suspicious allegations in the police investigation and the prosecution’s case. All crime empties recovered at the scene were attributed to the accused persons and none to the police, even though the police acknowledged there was firing on both sides. Crime empties and weapons were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory after an unexplained delay of 11 days. None of the 18 witnesses attributed the direct role of firing at the victim to any particular accused or member of the procession, while all of the accused attributed the fatal injury to police firing. The prosecution evidence lacked examination of any independent or other material witness; none of the motorway police (not involved in the shooting) or the driver or passengers of a nearby bus allegedly taken hostage were examined. Instead the case relied on “vague/general allegations with material contradictions about the whole incident, particularly about suppression of fact of police firing”. The possibility that the police had actually caused death of the victim could not be ruled out. Thus the accused’s murder convictions were set aside.

The accused was convicted under PPC 302(b) and Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979), and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a young girl. The Federal Shariat Court upheld the sentence.

The accused was alleged to have raped and murdered the deceased, leaving her body in a forest. A prosecution witness claimed to have seen the deceased entering the shop of the accused but admitted on cross-examination that at the relevant time he was en route to another destination, and that the shop was not on his way. Another prosecution witness claimed to have seen the accused walking towards the forest with a bag but it was never established that this bag contained a dead body, and the body was not found in a bag. The accused allegedly made a confession before a Magistrate but he later retracted it before the Trial Court so in the absence of independent corroboration, the confession could not be relied upon. Medical evidence could not establish who committed the murder. The police claimed to have recovered incriminating articles from the accused which allegedly belonged to the deceased. However the dates on the notes recording the recoveries had obviously been tampered with and the prosecution failed to convincingly show that the articles belonged to the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the case appeared to be based on the suspicion of the police and prosecution rather than evidence. The accused was acquitted.

The accused were convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) for the kidnap and murder of a very young child. The Lahore High Court confirmed the sentence.

The Supreme Court found the evidence to be inadequate and suspicious. Witnesses allegedly saw the accused carrying the deceased’s body on a motorbike, yet remained silent for three days before coming over. Moreover the court noted that the evidence was doubtful because it was beyond comprehension that the accused would have transported the dead body so openly. Another witness allegedly saw the accused disposing of the body while he was visiting a workshop at 11:00pm – again the Court noted how unnatural it would be for someone to visit a workshop at such a time, without any further evidence explaining why. Extra-judicial confessions were introduced but the Court stated clearly that “evidence of this type because of its being concocted easily is always looked at with doubt and suspicion. It could be taken as corroborative of the charge if it, in the first instance, rings true and then finds support from other evidence of unimpeachable character. If the other evidence lacks such attribute, it has to be excluded from consideration.” The accused were alleged to have confessed to a close relative of the complainant, which the Court found did not ring true.

The physical evidence was also suspicious – medical evidence did not support the prosecution’s story and the chemical examiner’s first report as withheld. Alleged recoveries appeared “contrived and conjured up” because the police recovered nothing on a first raid of the accused’s home, but claimed to have made many recoveries during a second raid 15 days later. The Court concluded that, “where circumstances so reported are tinkered and tampered with, or contrived and conjured up, they cannot be accepted without careful and critical analysis. Circumstantial evidence can form the basis of conviction if it is incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of this guilt.” Finding too many suspicions in the evidence, the Court acquitted the accused.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death for murder under section PPC 302(b). The High Court confirmed the sentence. The accused and a co-accused were alleged to have stabbed a man to death using a chhurri. The co-accused was acquitted at trial. An eyewitness had attributed identical roles to both accused, and neither the State nor the complainant had challenged the co-accused’s acquittal. The Supreme Court held that this demonstrated that the eye-witness was capable of falsehood. Moreover, the accused’s version of events was actually corroborated—he sustained injuries himself, which was supported by the medical report but supressed at trial. A churri was recovered from the appellant’s custody but the Court found it inconsequential because there was no evidence of blood on this item. Finally, there was an unexplained delay of 11 hours between the death and the post-mortem—the Court stated that this time “had been consumed by the complainant party and the local police in procuring and planting eye-witnesses and in cooking up a story for the prosecution.” The accused was acquitted.

The accused was convicted under PPC 302(b) and sentenced to death. The Lahore High Court confirmed the sentence. The accused was alleged to have killed his father’s second wife and her five minor children, wanting to receive an undue share of his father’s property.

The Supreme Court found that much of the evidence introduced was doubtful or suspicious. There was a delay of 18 to 36 hours between the death and the post-mortem, which the Court found indicative of “a lot of deliberation” before actually registering the FIR. An eye-witness who claimed to have seen the accused entering the victims’ house with a hatched in the middle of the night, had no evidence to support his being there (as he lived very far away) and did not report the story until some time later. The Court thus stated he was “procured and planted at some subsequent stage.” The prosecution relied most on recovery of a blood-stained hatchet from the accused during the investigation, but the item was taken from a cattle shed of the complainant, and was thus not in exclusive custody of the accused. The blood on the hatchet was not tested for two years, while the Court stated it has been proven scientifically that human blood disintegrates in weeks. The accused was alleged to have made an extra-judicial confession to “person A,” who then brought the accused to police – yet “person A” was never produced and both the accused and police stated that the arrest had taken place elsewhere. The Court concluded there were serious doubts as to each and every aspect of the prosecution’s case, and acquitted the accused.

The accused was sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) for the murder of the complainant’s son.

The Lahore High Court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment and the complainant appealed to the Supreme Court for enhancement of sentence. The Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction—ocular testimony was provided by the brother of complainant and a weapon recovered from the accused matched the empties recovered at the occurrence. However medical reports corroborated that the cause of death was a single gunshot fired by the accused. Because the accused fired only one mortal gunshot and the occurrence was a sudden affair, the Supreme Court refused to enhance the sentence and upheld the sentence of life imprisonment.

Two accused were sentenced to death under section PPC 365(A) and 302(b) and ATA 7(e) for kidnapping and brutally murdering a young child. The Lahore High Court upheld the sentence. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court re-stated the principal that “mere heinous or gruesome nature of crime shall not detract the Court of law in any manner from the due course to judge and make the appraisal of evidence in a laid down manner and to extend the benefit of reasonable doubt to an accused person being indefeasible and inalienable right of an accused. In getting influence from the nature of the crime and other extraneous consideration might lead the Judges to a patently wrong conclusion. In that event the justice would be casualty.” Thus, even in the case of this very serious crime, the Court carefully considered all evidence and, finding the case to be based on insufficient circumstantial evidence, acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with murder under PPC 302(b) and acquitted at trial. On appeal, the High Court of Balochistan convicted the accused and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court made clear that the death penalty is no longer considered a default sentence for murder, stating “the infliction of death penalty” is justified only “when the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting, or dastardly manner, so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community…” The court also explained that judicial discretion allowed for the “altering and converting [of] the death penalty,” with respects to the facts and circumstances of the case, pursuant to PPC 302(b). Exercising this discretion would “advance the rationale and philosophy behind the mandate of Article 9 of the Constitution.”

The Court further outlined that in any murder case, “there may be a host of extenuating and mitigating circumstances such as extreme youth, sudden provocation, influence of an elder, question of family honour etc. justifying the award of the lesser penalty of life imprisonment based on a chain of judicial pronouncements offering useful guidelines.” This analysis is dependent on a detailed review of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

The Court also quoted the Indian Supreme Court case of Macchi Singh and others v State of Punjab (AIR 1983 SC 957) as stating that “The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability. . . Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime.”

After analyzing the specific facts of the instant case, particularly that the murder was not planned and was in response to provocation, the Supreme Court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.

The two accused were convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b), and the sentence was upheld by the Lahore High Court. At the time of their Supreme Court hearing, the accused had served over 25 years each in prison while pursuing their appeals.

The Supreme Court noted that PPC 302(b) provides that a person committing qatl-e-amd shall be punished with death orimprisonment for life. The Court considered the doctrine of expectancy of life; that the delay to the conclusion of a trial could lead the accused to coming to expect life, as it were, even with a death sentence having been initially levied. In this regard, the Court considered the judicial authorities and drew out the following three principles:

1. Where a convict, sentenced to death on a charge or murder, experiences a delay in the final disposition of a legal remedy, and they have undergone a period of incarceration that is less than that of a term of life imprisonment, then this delay cannot be used to reduce the sentence from death to life imprisonment.
2. Where the complainant is seeking the enhancement of a sentence to death, and during the pendency of the trial the convict ends up serving a term equivalent to life imprisonment, then the principle of expectancy of life can lead to the sentence not being enhanced to death. As such, the spirit of Article 13(a) of the Constitution can be considered as a factor, along with other factors such as life expectancy and the case facts, for not enhancing the sentence to death, at such a late stage.
3. Where the convict sentenced to death undergoes a period of custody equal to or longer than the term of life imprisonment, during the pendency of his trial, then the expectancy of life ‘may be a relevant factor to be considered along with the other factors’ in reducing the sentence from death to life imprisonment.

The third principle was engaged and the Court ruled that a death sentence in the case would be “unconscionably delayed punishment, delayed to such an extent that the punishment is aggravated beyond the contemplation of the relevant law itself.” The Court specified however that such treatment was only appropriate where the delay was caused by pursuit of judicial remedy, and not where the delay was caused by the Executive in deciding a mercy petition, after judicial remedies were exhausted. Similarly, the principle would not be relevant in a case “wherein the convict is himself demonstrably and significantly responsible for the delay occasioned in conclusion of his judicial remedies.” The death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment.

It is critical to note that such commutation is discretionary: the court may commute a death sentence where the accused has already been imprisoned for more than a complete life sentence. Such treatment is not automatic, so a strong case must be built to convince the courts to extend such treatment.

The accused were convicted of murder and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b) and 34. The Lahore High Court upheld the sentences.

The Supreme Court again stated that PPC 302(b) affords the court the discretion to choose between a sentence of death or life imprisonment for murder, and stated that “if the intent of the Legislature was to take away the discretion of the Court, then it would have omitted from clause (b) of section 302, PPC, the alternative sentence of life imprisonment.”

This discretion was to be exercised based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court noted that even “a single mitigating circumstance…would be sufficient to put on guard the Judge not to award the penalty of death but life imprisonment” and that “if the Judge/Judges entertain some doubt, albeit not sufficient for acquittal, judicial caution must be exercised to award the alternative sentence of life imprisonment.”

Whilst the Court refused to give a set of strict guidelines on how to apply this discretion, it went to great pains to communicate that “In any case, if a single doubt or ground is available, creating reasonable doubt in the mind of Court/Judge to award death penalty or life imprisonment, it would be sufficient circumstances to adopt alternative course by awarding life imprisonment instead of death sentence.”

In the instant case, lack of a clear motive was enough for such doubt to be created. The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The accused were convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced to death under CNSA 9(c). The Lahore High Court commuted the death sentence to 14 years’ imprisonment.

Police discovered large quantities of Charas and opium in a parked vehicle with two flat tyres.

The complainant was a police officer, who received a report that customs officials and police had encountered a vehicle and that shots had been fired by both the occupants of the vehicle and the police/customs officials. The complainant, accompanied by other officers, discovered a vehicle matching the description with two flat tyres, which contained large quantities of Charas and opium. The accused were arrested because they had Kalashnikovs and spare magazines with live rounds, which was said conclusively to prove that they were members of a criminal enterprise involved in the trafficking of narcotics. The accused denied their involvement, and were not seen in the vehicle nor running away from it. Though the vehicle was stopped at 2:00 pm, the accused were apprehended less than 100 yards away at 4:45 pm. The Supreme Court considered it unbelievable that, in a timespan of nearly three hours, the occupants of the vehicle would have remained nearby, waiting to be apprehended. The Court stated that due to “mere apprehension of the two appellants with two Kalashnikovs but in the absence of any connecting evidence that they were either seen while sitting in the vehicle or running away nor any documentary evidence to connect the two appellants with the vehicle in question, the appellants would be entitled to benefit of doubt”. Both accused were acquitted.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to death under CNSA 9(c) for driving a truck containing 171 kg of Charas and 73 kg of opium. The Lahore High Court confirmed the sentence. The accused claimed to be innocent and said he had no knowledge that the illicit substances were concealed in the truck. The Supreme Court considered the facts of the case and ruled that, pursuant to Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, the death sentence could be commuted on the grounds that a sentence of life imprisonment would also have a deterrent effect.

The accused was tried for killing his brother. He was convicted under PPC 302(b) and sentenced to death. The Lahore High Court confirmed conviction and sentence. At trial, the accused admitted to the offence in his statements under oath as per Cr.P.C section 340(2), and he re-affirmed that admission under questioning from the trial court judge as under Cr.P.C 342.

Both lower courts relied heavily on the “confession.” The Supreme Court ruled that the accused’s statements were an admission, not a confession. To be legally admissible, an in-court confession must meet a strict definition, which the court cited as follows:

1. That the accused is in full senses and understands the consequences of making a confession;
2. That, the confession was not a result of any duress, coercion or any promise by the prosecution, to be made an approver;
3. That, during transit of the accused by the police from and to the Trial Court from the prison, on each “Paishi”no threat or pressure was applied by the escorting police guard or incharge thereof;
4. What were the actual facts, which induced the accused to confess after facing trial, during which he pleaded innocence all the way;
5. The court recording the confession has to ensure that the mental capacity of the accused is not diminished due to any illness and if some indication of abnormality is suspected by the Court, it is better to refer the accused to the Standing Medical Boardto ascertain the true cause thereof;
6. While recording the confession, the same safeguards and precautions be adopted, by directing the Public Prosecutor, the complainant’s counsel, the Naib Court and all other officials to leave the Court. If need be, the counsel who represents him, may be given an opportunity to be present inside the Court during the whole process, if the accused person, on asking by the Trial Judge, so demands;
7. The handcuffs of the accused be removed and he be provided a chair on the dais. He may be given some time to think over the making of the confession and in that regard particular questions be put to him, as to why he was making the confession when he has already pleaded innocence and claimed trial at the time, the formal charge was framed;
8. The Trial Judge shall explain to the accused that, in case of making confession, he has to face a capital sentence in a murder case or any offence punishable with death;
9. The entire record of all the questions and answers recorded, be properly maintained and thereafter, a proper certificatebe appended thereto, showing the satisfaction of the Trial Judge that the accused person was not mentally sick and he was making the confession voluntarily, based on true facts and that, there was no other compelling reason behind that. (Emphasis added)

Because these requirements were not met, the court ruled that the statements were not a confession but rather a mere admission and stated that “ordinarily on such admission, awarding capital sentence of death shall be avoided and to prove the guilt of an accused, evidence of the complainant or the prosecution has to be recorded, in the interest of safe administration of justice.” Therefore, the admission was insufficient evidence to support a death sentence and because the prosecution had otherwise failed to meet its burden of proof, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

The accused was charged with rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl. Among other convictions, he was convicted of murder under PPC 302(b) and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to life imprisonment.

The girl had gone missing after going to a nearby shop to buy cookies, and her body was found the next day. The Local General Councillor claimed that the accused had come to his home and confessed to the crime, and had sought the Councillor’s help in reaching a compromise with the girl’s father. The Councillor and the accused both stated that they were not on good terms with each other, and the Councillor explained that during the previous election, the accused and his family had supported the rival candidate. In considering the alleged confession, the Supreme Court stated that “the legal worth of the extra judicial confession . . . is almost equal to naught, keeping in view the natural course of events, human behaviour, conduct and probabilities, in ordinary course.” The Court stated that it was not believable that the accused would have confessed his crime to the Councillor and sought his assistance, when both parties agreed they were not on good terms. The Court went on to state that “the extra judicial confession has never been considered sufficient for recording conviction on a capital charge unless it is strongly corroborated by tangible evidence coming from unimpeachable source.” The confession was found “entirely insufficient” to carry the charge and, finding flaws with all other evidence as well, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused of all charges.

Two co-accused were convicted and sentenced to death under PPC 302(b), among other convictions, for kidnap and murder of a young boy in Rawalpindi. The convictions and death sentence were confirmed by the Lahore High Court.

Each co-accused had recorded a confession before a Magistrate, which each later retracted. The prosecution also alleged that one of the accused had confessed his crime to a close relative of the deceased. The relative alleged that he had received the confession in Rawalpindi but had to travel to Peshawar to conclude an important business deal, so he told the police of the confession the next day upon his return. Although confessions were recorded before a Magistrate, the Supreme Court found that the Magistrate had committed successive illegalities in recording the confessions and had thus failed to satisfy the High Court Rules, which lay out a binding procedure for observing the requirements of Cr.P.C sections 364 and 164. The Supreme Court described the requirements in detail as follows:

The fundamental logic behind the same is that, all signs of fear inculcated by the Investigating Agency in the mind of the accused are to be shedded out and he is to be provided full assurance that in case he is not guilty or is not making a confession voluntarily then in that case, he would not be handed over back to the police. Thereafter, sufficient time for reflection is to be given after the first warning is administered. At the expiry of that time, Recording Magistrate has to administer the second warning and the accused shall be assured that now he was in the safe hands. All police officials whether in uniform or otherwise, including Naib Court attached to the Court must be kept outside the Court and beyond the view of the accused. After observing all these legal requirements if the accused person is willing to confess, then all required questions formulated by the High Court Rules should be put to him and the answers given, be recorded in the words spoken by him. The statement of accused be recorded by the Magistrate with his own hand and in case there is a genuine compelling reason then, a special note is to be given that the same was dictated to a responsible official of the Court like Stenographer or Reader and oath shall also be administered to such official that he would correctly type or write the true and correct version, the accused stated and dictated by the Magistrate. In case, the accused is illiterate, the confession he makes, if recorded in another language i.e. Urdu or English then, after its completion, the same be read-over and explained to him in the language, the accused fully understand and thereafter a certificate, as required under section 364, Cr.P.C. with regard to these proceedings be given by the Magistrate under his seal and signatures and the accused shall be sent to jail on judicial remand and during this process at no occasion he shall be handed over to any police official/officer whether he is Naib Court wearing police uniform, or any other police official/officer, because such careless dispensation would considerably diminish the voluntary nature of the confession, made by the accused. (Emphasis added)

The court noted that the Magistrate “was so careless that the confessions of both the appellants were recorded on oath, grossly violating the law” and that “after recording the confessions of the appellants on oath, both were handed over to the same police officer, who had produced them in the Court in handcuffs. This fact bespeaks volumes that the Recording Magistrate was either not knowing the law on the subject or he was acting in the police way desired by it, compromising his judicial, obligations.” Overall, the failure to strictly satisfy the High Court Rules “rendered the confession inadmissible which cannot be safely relied upon keeping in view the principle of safe administration of justice.” The confessions could not corroborate each other because each was tainted.

Regarding the alleged confession to a relative of the deceased, the court found the allegation to be “highly insensible” and “counter to natural human conduct and behaviour” that an accused would confess such a grisly crime to a relative of the deceased, particularly without seeking his assistance to reach compromise. Further, the court found it unreasonable that, upon receiving such confession, the relative would have concluded his business dealings without relaying the confession to his relatives or the police until the next day. The court noted that “It is a consistent view of the Courts that extra-judicial confession, if made before a person of influence and authority, expected to extend helping hand to the accused, which is also strongly corroborated, can only be considered as a piece of circumstantial evidence . . . Such evidence is held to be the weakest type of evidence. No conviction on capital charge can be recorded on such evidence.” After finding issues with the little remaining evidence as well, the Supreme Court acquitted each accused of all charges.